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Scholar George Meneshian on :

🇦🇲 & 🇦🇿, THE BIGGER PICTURE:

The issue of the 🇦🇲/🇦🇿 exclaves is part of the 2 states' Soviet legacy. It was resolved de facto in the 90s when both occupied each other's exclaves + some other territories. Although the border demarcation isn't finalised, these territories are de jure part of 🇦🇿&🇦🇲. 🇦🇿's claims over its exclaves & the non-exclave villages in the Qazax District have a legal basis. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that 🇦🇿 is illegally

occupying 🇦🇲n territory since the 1st Nagorno Karabakh War. The occupation of large portions of Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022 made the situation more complicated. So did Baku's (in)direct claims over southern Armenia (Syunik) and other parts of the Republic of Armenia. Any discussion on the return of the Armenian-occupied territories to Azerbaijan must be part of a comprehensive agreement either on land swap or the return of all occupied land to its rightful owners as per int. law.

Unfortunately, this is not what Baku wants. In particular Aliyev's goal is to take everything without making any compromises necessary for the establishment of durable peace between the two nations. That is why he threatens 🇦🇲 with war instead of negotiating a peace treaty with Yerevan, despite the latter's post-2020 concessions. After the possible return of the exclaves & the villages, Baku will probably issue a new ultimatum demanding either of the following:

v_chaud

- Reparations.
- The opening of an extraterritorial corridor in Syunik.
- The demilitarisation of certain areas within the Armenian Republic.
It is true that, from 1998 until 2020, 🇦🇲 (the winning side of the 1991-1994 war), was reluctant in making certain concessions regarding the Nagorno Karabakh Issue, mainly with regard to the seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh. So did 🇦🇿, at some extent.The 2020 war and the Sep. 2023 attack on Artsakh violently 'resolved' the

the Nagorno Karabakh Issue (the catalyst of the 🇦🇲-🇦🇿 conflict). It did, however, accompany the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh's Armenian population which previously suffered by a 10-month blockade. I personally disagree with Yerevan's détente with 🇦🇿. Regardless of my personal opinion, 🇦🇲's stance & the end of Artsakh's de facto independence (theoretically) give a rare opportunity for a mutually beneficial dialogue that could lead to sustainable peace in Transcaucasia.

It is in Aliyev's hand to choose between escalation & dialogue, provocations & diplomacy, and eventually between war and peace. His actions and rhetoric indicate that he chooses to invest in nationalism & soft irredentism instead of negotiating a peace treaty with Armenia.Concluding, we should see the bigger picture when dealing with Az. demands and the the re-emerged discussion on the exclaves and other territories occupied by both Armenia and Az. during the 1st Nagorno Karabakh war.

End of 🧵